China is currently negotiating to join the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), having committed to these negotiations upon its accession to the WTO in 2001. The literature suggests that the local judicial system in China will bring challenges to the implementation of the GPA in terms of its effectiveness in providing judicial remedy to aggrieved suppliers. On the other hand, the GPA accession may provide some outside leverage that will enhance local institutional capacity. Drawing on the paradigm of selective adaptation, this article will examine to what extent international procurement rules, as set out in the GPA, can be adapted into China's local context. To tackle the issue of a weak judiciary, which might undermine the treaty's compliance, the author suggests that a model of an independent review body might be introduced as a reformed bid challenge procedure in government procurement law, which would be compatible with the GPA's requirements. From the comparative law perspective, the paradigm of selective adaptation reveals how local interpretation and implementation of international treaty standards are affected by normative perspectives derived from perception, complementarity, and legitimacy.