Residential College | false |
Status | 已發表Published |
Executive-Legislative Relationships and the Development of Public Policy | |
Eilo Yu Wing-yat | |
2011 | |
Source Publication | Gaming, Governance and Public Policy in Macao |
Author of Source | Newman M. K. Lam and Ian Scott |
Publication Place | Hong Kong |
Publisher | Hong Kong University Press |
Pages | 57-74 |
Abstract | The political system of the Macao Special Administrative Region retains the colonial practice of executive domination over other governmental institutions. This role is formally recognised in the Basic Law, which concentrates administrative and legislative power in the hands of the Chief Executive, and reflects the assumption of its drafters that the government will be 'executive-led' (Luo, 2005:883). As the head of the Special Administrative Region, the Chief Executive has, among many other powers, wide-ranging and largely unconstrained authority to decide government policies, to issue administrative regulations, to nominate Principal Officials, to appoint and remove judges and some members of the Legislative Assembly, to approve motions on revenue and expenditure, to return bills to the Legislative Assembly for further consideration, to order officials to testify or to give evidence before the Legislative Assembly, to confer medals and honours, to pardon persons convicted of criminal offences, and to handle petitions and complaints (Basic Law: Article 50). Although the legislature has the responsibility for passing bills, the Chief Executive remains dominant in the law-making process because almost all bills are proposed by the administration and because legislators are restricted by the conditions under which they can introduce private members' bills. If it so wished, the Macao government could use its powers to govern with only minimal involvement of the legislature. The Chief Executive could employ his considerable powers to make law by decree and to appoint legislators, thereby reducing the legislature to little more than a rubber stamp. Constitutionally, the Legislative Assembly is a 'minimal legislature' (Olson and Mezey, 1991:1-2; also see Mezey, 1985) that has little influence on the government and plays only a nominal role in policymaking. It has very limited powers to hold the executive branch accountable and its members are marginal players in the decision-making process. © 2011 by The Hong Kong University Press, HKU. All rights reserved. |
Keyword | Macao Politics Public Policy Legislature Executive-legislative Relations |
DOI | 10.5790/hongkong/9789888083282.003.0004 |
Language | 英語English |
ISBN | 978-988-8083-28-2 |
Scopus ID | 2-s2.0-84904449072 |
Fulltext Access | |
Citation statistics | |
Document Type | Book chapter |
Collection | Faculty of Social Sciences DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION |
Affiliation | University of Macau |
First Author Affilication | University of Macau |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Eilo Yu Wing-yat. Executive-Legislative Relationships and the Development of Public Policy[M]. Gaming, Governance and Public Policy in Macao, Hong Kong:Hong Kong University Press, 2011, 57-74. |
APA | Eilo Yu Wing-yat.(2011). Executive-Legislative Relationships and the Development of Public Policy. Gaming, Governance and Public Policy in Macao, 57-74. |
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