Political scientists have long studied competitive elections and electoral participation as an essential feature of democracy or democratization in developing countries (Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Verba 1980). The implementation of semi-competitive elections in rural post-Mao China since 1988 invariably has attracted great scholarly attention. Indeed, instituting villagers’ self-government by means of direct and contested elections in rural China is one of the most signifi cant political reforms in post-Mao China (Unger 2000: 89). The Organic Law of Villagers Committees (Trial) came into effect in June 1988 after it was passed by the National People’s Congress in November 1987. After ten years of implementation, the trial law was formalized in November 1998.1 Among the signifi cant changes that it brings about, the Organic Law (Permanent) aims to ensure fair and competitive elections by stipulating every villager’s right to directly nominate candidates (i.e. haixuan); election by means of non-equal quota method (i.e. more candidates than the number of offi ces to fi ll: cha e xuanju); and secret balloting (Article 14 of the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees; Jacobson 1999: 4); and by declaring that candidates running for the post of village head should be given a chance to air their views before elections.These elections are semi-competitive because rural residents are accorded the legal right under the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees to choose their candidates, but are not given the choice of different political platforms of different political parties.