Residential College | false |
Status | 已發表Published |
Legal positivism: emotivistic or naturalistic? | |
Zhai, X. | |
2011-06-01 | |
Source Publication | Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia e questioni pubbliche |
ISSN | Journal e-ISSN 2240-7987 | Journal p-ISSN 1591-06 |
Pages | 31-39 |
Abstract | Schofield argues that “neither methodological legal positivism nor substantive legal positivism […] can be attributed to Bentham.” One issue on which I feel unsure, but incline to disagree with him, is whether his arguments are sufficient to warrant his conclusion that “Bentham was not a legal positivist in the senses in which Hart understood that notion.” The argument that I would like to take issue with is Schofield’s proposition that the 20th-century distinction between fact and value is “an essential element and crucial underlying assumption of contemporary Hartian legal positivism”, and that Bentham, as a naturalist rejecting such distinction, is not a legal positivist. |
Keyword | Hart Bentham Legal Positivism Emotivistic Naturalistic |
URL | View the original |
Language | 英語English |
The Source to Article | PB_Publication |
Document Type | Journal article |
Collection | DEPARTMENT OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES |
Corresponding Author | Zhai, X. |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Zhai, X.. Legal positivism: emotivistic or naturalistic?[J]. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, 2011, 31-39. |
APA | Zhai, X..(2011). Legal positivism: emotivistic or naturalistic?. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, 31-39. |
MLA | Zhai, X.."Legal positivism: emotivistic or naturalistic?".Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia e questioni pubbliche (2011):31-39. |
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