| Status | 已發表Published |
| The Pragmatics of Self-Deception | |
Dolcini, N. 
| |
| 2016-06-29 | |
| Source Publication | New Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science |
| Publication Place | London |
| Publisher | College Publications |
| Pages | 67-76 |
| Abstract | The current philosophical debate on self-deception is characterized by a divide between intentionalist and anti-intentionalist views. Despite the differences between the two competing approaches, especially with respect to whether subjects deceive themselves intentionally or unintentionally, I will argue that they tend to converge on, among other aspects, the interpretation of self-deception as a process by which the subjects fail to acquire knowledge. The condition for self-deception that the subject’s acquired (self-deceptive) belief is a false belief gathers wide and transversal agreement from both the sides of the divide. I will provide criticism about the validity of such a condition by showing that it doesn’t match our common intuitions; some positive consequences of cutting the false-belief condition out of the set of conditions for self-deception will be explored. Finally, I suggest that self-deceivers manifest a deviant doxastic behavior with respect to the wider (doxastic) context, and I introduce a novel condition - the ‘Deviation Condition’ - which grasps the social and pragmatic dimension of self-deception. The proposed ‘tridimensional’ account is a unified model applying to both individual and collective self-deception. |
| Keyword | self-deception false belief cognitive bias doxastic deviancy |
| URL | View the original |
| Language | 英語English |
| ISBN | 9781848901605 |
| The Source to Article | PB_Publication |
| PUB ID | 21402 |
| Document Type | Book chapter |
| Collection | DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES Faculty of Arts and Humanities |
| Corresponding Author | Dolcini, N. |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Dolcini, N.. The Pragmatics of Self-Deception[M]. New Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science, London:College Publications, 2016, 67-76. |
| APA | Dolcini, N..(2016). The Pragmatics of Self-Deception. New Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science, 67-76. |
| Files in This Item: | There are no files associated with this item. | |||||
Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
Edit Comment