How should philosophy be done? What types of evidence suit philosophy? How to compare multiple philosophical theories? How should one understand philosophical disagreement? These are just a few of the various metaphilosophical problems concerning the method that philosophers do or ought to comply with in their practice. Traditionally, the answers provided to questions of this sort contextually reveal the pluralistic nature of philosophy as a discipline, and they sometimes lead to the very foundation and development of new movements and traditions in the field. Just as the pioneers of the Analytic tradition held that philosophy should begin with the analysis of propositions, and Husserl’s technique for gaining access to phenomena gave rise to the phenomenological tradition, the most recent debates on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophical inquiry strictly relate to the emergence of experimental philosophy. The pluralism characterizing current practices in philosophy should not, however, lead us to dismiss the idea that a unitary method in philosophy is possible. Nor the desire for methodological homogeneity should encourage us to regard pluralism as problematic per se, and perhaps as an obstacle to be removed for the sake of disciplinary methodological unity. In this paper, I aim at providing support to the view that the problem of the philosophical method is not just worth being addressed, but also especially urgent, as well as compatible with pluralism in philosophy as defined above. By drawing upon Hector-Neri Castaneda’s model for philosophical method, I will highlight the main requirements that a philosophical method shall satisfy in order to function within the pluralistic status quo of contemporary philosophical practices. Rather than being incompatible with the quest for a unitary methodology, I will argue, the (fortunate) reality of philosophical pluralism – which consistently produces a multitude of theories addressing homologous data/phenomena – requires us to look for general methodological criteria as to allow for their comparative assessment. In this sense, the starting point for the reflection on philosophical method is not the mere tolerance for variance in philosophical practices, but it is rather the recognition that any “diaphilosophical” activity essentially needs different theories and systems to compare. As pointed out by Hector-Neri Castañeda in his On Philosophical Method, “philosophy just is different things to different persons. Philosophy is diaphilosophical all the way through” (Castañeda, H.-N., On Philosophical Method, Indiana, NOUS Publications, 1, 1980, p. 133).