Status | 已發表Published |
才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露 | |
Alternative Title | Talent Signaling or Compensation Justification:Excess Executive Compensation and Information Disclosure on Strategy |
Cheng, X.; Liu, J.; Chen, J.J. | |
2015-12-01 | |
Source Publication | 金融研究 |
ISSN | 1003-2886 |
Pages | 146-161 |
Abstract | This paper examines whether executives disclose more information on strategy( SID) when whey obtain excess compensation,and further examines whether the motivation is consistent with the Management talent signaling hypothesis or Justifying Compensation hypothesis. We find excess compensation and SID is positively related,and this relation is more likely to happen when the company is SOEs,especially central enterprises,when the PPS is lower or when the institutional investors holding is lower,which is consistent with Justifying Compensation hypothesis. That means when executives obtain excess compensation,whey will disclose more SID to show their false ability in order to improve their compensation’s legitimate and rationality. This paper studies information disclosure motivation from the executive justifying compensation perspective,extending the research on information disclosure incentives in the context of developing countries. |
Keyword | Excess compensation Information disclosure on strategy Management talent signaling hypothesis Justifying compensation hypothesis |
URL | View the original |
Language | 其他語言Others |
The Source to Article | PB_Publication |
PUB ID | 54686 |
Document Type | Journal article |
Collection | University of Macau |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Cheng, X.,Liu, J.,Chen, J.J.. 才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 146-161. |
APA | Cheng, X.., Liu, J.., & Chen, J.J. (2015). 才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露. 金融研究, 146-161. |
MLA | Cheng, X.,et al."才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露".金融研究 (2015):146-161. |
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