In this essay, I would like to defend Heidegger against the above charge by a careful reading of Heidegger’s “who-analysis” in Being and Time. The essay is divided into four related sections. First, I argue that Heidegger’s theory of “being-with” is “being-in-the-world-with-one-another”, which is a continuation of his anti-subjective “being-in-the-world”. There is no inconsistency between Heidegger’s “world-analysis” and his “who-analysis”. Second, based on a detailed reading of Heidegger, I claim that his theory of “being-with” and his sharp criticism of the “public-ness” of das Man is not proof of the solipsist character of his thought, but rather proof of its anti-subjective character. The key point missed by many critics is the distinction between the “public” and “community”, and between “ego-nomy” and “auto-nomy”. Criticism of the “public” does not necessarily lead to solipsist “egology”. Rather, the “dictatorship” of the “public-ness” of das Man is based on solipsist “ego-nomy”. Third, I try to clarify Heidegger’s view that the establishment of the dictatorship of das Man in Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world not only results from the traditional philosophical view of the “subject character” of Dasein, but also has its existential grounding in the way of Dasein’s saying of language, i.e. “discourse” (das Rede). Finally, I conclude that the anti-subjective character of Heidegger’s theory of being-with leads to a new interpretation of Heidegger’s authentic “being-in-the-world-with-one-another” as “existential communal being”. This “communal being” is the ontological and existential status of each of us, and grounds true individuality, i.e. individual uniqueness and autonomy.