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ABSTRACT

Previous studies in China's policy process have paid limited attention to public perceptions of experts. Through an original survey, we explore public attitudes on expertise, i.e., the merits of expert opinion and expert autonomy. We find that professional experience is the most important criterion on which respondents evaluate experts. The higher a respondent's political trust is, the more likely he or she is to recognize the benefits that experts may offer. We also find an underlying populist tendency towards the role of experts in policy making, respondents in general agree that the will of the people should be prioritized over expert opinion.

According to Grundmann (2017), there are three differences between experts and lay people. Experts are located in the professions and sciences, possess technical skills and are trustworthy because they should be neutral in making judgements. As policy actors, experts have played an increasingly influential and active role in policy processes in recent decades (Christensen & Holst, 2017; Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008; Hunter & Boswell, 2015; Köllner et al., 2018). This trend can be partly explained by the complexity of policy making related to advanced technology and social issues such as climate change, biotechnology, public health and artificial intelligence, which require policy makers to frequently consult and seek advice from experts (e.g., Bogliacino et al., 2021). An equally important reason lies in scientific communication and policy legitimation. Policy making in democracies requires support and consent from stakeholders. The more stakeholders believe that authorities are acting on behalf of stakeholders' own interests and rights, the more legitimate is a policy (Wallner, 2008). However, when stakeholders lack information or are unable to interpret the reasoning of policymakers, policy legitimation is difficult. Experts therefore may become a source of legitimacy when they communicate with the public. The public may trust them more given their profession and expertise and relative independence from the government. This explains why under authoritarian regimes, where the policy process is supposed to be exclusive and coercive (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Svolik, 2012), policymakers sometimes legitimize policy-making through expert endorsement (Jones, 2019). However, the majority of existing

studies on expert involvement focus on democracies. Little is known about the politics of expertise in nondemocracies.

Follow the definition from Grundmann, experts in the context of China mainly includes university professors, think tank analysts, researchers in official research institutions[1] and other professionals (e.g., lawyer, journalist). Although previous studies have already provided rich examples in why they are able to attend and make influence in policy process in a single party authoritarian regime (Teets, 2018; Zhu, 2009), little attentions concern how ordinary people perceived the role of experts. This question is important because policy legitimation is only feasible when people share a consensus on 'who experts are' with the government. As far as we known, the present study is the first social survey to explore public attitudes towards experts in China. In addition to asking respondents what items they used in evaluating expert qualifications, we also asked about their attitudes towards the merits of expert opinion, the autonomy of experts and the appropriateness of experts' policy influence. Normatively, respondents agreed that experts should be independent and that their opinions should have more weight in policy than those of government officials and the public. However, regression analysis revealed an underlying populist trend that emphasized people-centrism and anti-elitism (Bertsou & Caramani, 2022) towards expert opinions in policy making. We also found political trust serves as the mediator in perceptions of the role of experts. The more political trust respondents have, the more likely they are to recognize that more expert autonomy and independent opinions from experts are valuable. In other words, people perceive a connection between experts' autonomy and merits and the regime/government in China, which contradicts the common definition in studies on democracies that experts should be neutral and independent from party interests (Zhu & Xue, 2007). We will provide a preliminary explanation on the reason behind, but because the present study was explorative, we leave detail discuss in the mechanism for further studies and focus on the research questions mentioned before. In short, we believe that the present study not only fills a gap on public attitudes towards experts in China but also advances our understanding of the politics of expertise in a nondemocratic context (Belyaeva, 2019; Gewirtz, 2017; Huneeus, 2000; Lei, 2021).

Evolution and dynamics in the role of experts in China

Studying the role of experts in China, one mustn't overlook the state-expert relationship. Zhu and Xue (2007) had used criticized that applying the common definition of think tank from the United States is misleading because 'there are no such organisations in China due to China's one party dominated system'.[2] As all sectors are institutionally embedded in the regime, think tanks should be modified as 'an "external brain", and in some distinct and relevant sense, independent of the government'. 'External brain' here means provide constructive criticism without challenging to the government agenda as their counterparts in the democracies. This is why Xue et al. (2018) argued that the bloom of think tanks in China in recent decades is not because of ideological relaxation or democratization but because the increasingly complex policy problems that policy makers face have triggered the need for expert consultation. The same epistemology is also applicable in the case of experts (Gewirtz, 2017; Shambaugh, 2002; Tanner, 2002). Institutionally not independent doesn't undermine them as 'external brains', rather it is the connection with the regime

provide experts the channels to become an influential policy actor (Zhu, 2009). A role we describe as Science Arbiter, a typology borrowed from Pielke (2007, p. 2), refers to 'a resource for the decision-maker, standing ready to answer factual questions that the decision-maker thinks are relevant. The Science Arbiter does not tell the decision-maker what he or she ought to prefer'. A salient example is the policy making in national five-year plans, the most comprehensive development scheme in China, for which a constant expert committee was set up in 2006 to offer policy consultation. According to Hu (2013), a professor at the Tsinghua University and a member of the expert committee, the whole process of developing five-year plans involves 11 steps.[3] Because the CCP maintains final decision-making power, experts are mainly involved in agenda setting and policy making as assistants of the state apparatus. At the local level, consulting expert opinion is a necessary procedure in the so-called 'momentous government decision'.[4]

Even when experts are not directly invited by the government to offer policy consultation, they may still state their position to the media and the public, in a capacity that we describe as their second role – policy entrepreneurs (Zhu, 2009). Mertha (2009) used the case of the Nu River hydroelectric power plant to illustrate how experts are able to act as policy entrepreneurs on some social issues, such as environmental protection (other issues include health care and public administration; He & Thøgersen, 2010; Zhu, 2013). Expert involvement can even change the final policy outcome under some conditions. As leong and Wu (2020) pointed out, the underlying mechanism can be understood as a punctuated-equilibrium process: policy change happens when a policy subsystem is no longer dominated by one policy image defined as 'a mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals' (Baumgartner, 2013). The policy image upheld by the government is challenged by experts, and the policy image that they construct receives extra credibility because of their expertise. In turn, this image becomes more likely to raise the concerns of and generate support from stakeholders.

In summary, the literature has demonstrated the evolution and dynamics of China's politics of expertise. On the one hand, similar to the trajectory Nachiappan et al. (2010) observed in East and Southeast Asia, 'many think tanks were created as instruments to legitimise and consolidate existing regimes or leaders- as well as the developmental state narrative'., Deng Xiaoping used mentioned the relationship between 'red' and 'expertise' that 'Being "red" means one must strive to be "expert" . . . We cannot reconcile ourselves to lagging behind others; if we do, we will not survive' (Gewirtz, 2017, p. 71). Experts was instrumentally used by the CCP to mitigate uncertainty in policy making but cautiously contains the capability of the latter to raise a competitive agenda (Shen et al., 2022). On the other hand, even experts' autonomy is relative, they are not always entrenched government position, an increasing amount of evidence shows that they can be policy entrepreneurs and serve as the necessary condition for policy change in a growing diversified Chinese society (leong & Wu, 2020; Shen et al., 2022). Existing literatures, however, has not paid enough attention to the emerging function that experts serve in policy legitimation. Under such circumstances, experts are neither an instrument used by policy-makers nor issue advocates themselves but rather communicators between the government and people. A recent example is the role of Zhong Nanshan during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a pulmonologist and member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, he has been well known in Chinese society as a public health expert since the battle against severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003. When the COVID-19

outbreak occurred in China in January 2020, Zhong Nanshan was promptly appointed director of the crisis management expert committee by the Ministry of Technology and frequently elaborated government policy on official media.[5] For instance, on 21 January 2020, he announced that given that COVID-19 had a high infection rate, isolating infected patients at the very beginning is crucial. On 23 January 2020, Wuhan City began a 76-day lockdown, and less restrictive measures, such as quarantines and tracing of travel records, were imposed nationwide. China was the first country to impose such restrictions when the pandemic started, and it may be difficult to evaluate how much experts helped elicit public consent to the measures. In this case, Zhong Nanshan made his opinion public, and the CCP demonstrated its intention to legitimate the policy position by referring to scientific knowledge from experts. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such policy legitimation relies on a similarity in the understandings of the government and the people on 'who experts are'. The government's effort to use experts to legitimize a policy will be in vain if people (1) have criteria different from the government's for evaluating an expert, or (2) do not believe that experts should play as important a role as the government may believe. Therefore, the pre-condition of the effectiveness of expert opinion in policy legitimation is the government choose the right 'expert' in scientific communication, which in return justify the importance of public perceptions on the role of experts.

Public attitude towards experts, regime performance and policy legitimation in China

Legitimacy is generally defined as people's belief in the appropriateness of government actions and decision-making on behalf of their interests (Wallner, 2008). Policy legitimacy is important because it allows policy outcomes to be achieved at a lower cost than that of illegitimate policies, as people are more willing to consent (Bogliacino et al., 2021). The literature suggests two types of policy legitimacy (Montpetit, 2008) – input-oriented (citizen-centred) and output-oriented (expertise-based) – which correspond to two methods of legitimation: through procedure and through efficacy. While the two types of policy legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, 'input-oriented processes have higher potential in terms of legitimacy deficit reduction than output-oriented processes, but they take longer, notably because they require the involvement of large numbers of people' (Montpetit, 2008). Authoritarian regimes are skewed towards output-oriented policy legitimacy because the policy process is institutionally exclusive. As Gerschewski (2018) pointed out, legitimacy under authoritarianism is not an oxymoron – indeed, legitimacy is an essential feature in such regimes. Referring to scientific knowledge can be a strategy for autocrats to remedy deficits of inclusion and can provide justifications for the policy choices made by the government.

Such a strategy follows the deficit model of scientific communication, which assumes a linear relationship between scientific knowledge and perceptions of advanced technology (Durant, 1999). In other words, when the information gap between experts and people is reduced, they should share a similar policy position. Empirical evidence nevertheless does not fully support the existence of such a linear relationship between scientific knowledge and policy positions, at least for some advanced technologies (e.g., genetically modified food) and social issues (e.g., economic policy).[6] A possible explanation is that in

practice, most people are more likely to rely on sources that they trust in judging complex issues instead of exerting effort to learn scientific knowledge (Lachapelle et al., 2014; Siegrist, 2000); when people lack trust in experts, the assumption of the deficit model does not hold. In the case of China, the correlation between deficit model and policy legitimation is more complex because of the state-expert relationship. Some studies suggested that political trust matters for risk perception, for example, G. He et al. (2013) found that residents deemed government information on the perceived benefits and risks in nuclear power the most trustworthy source (in comparison with information from the media, environmental NGOs, institutes or universities). The source of political trust in China mainly derived from regime performance (e.g., economic development; Yang & Tang, 2010), It is reasonable to predict a good regime performance may provide credits for output policy legitimacy (measured by political trust) and further for policy support in general. However, will a high political trust necessarily transit to expert opinion which endorsed government policy under the deficit model is yet to confirm. Moreover, previous studies in other contexts suggested that ideological spectrum influence the attitude towards experts, Cofnas et al. (2018), for example, found that the conservative public in the United States has declining trust in scientists because they tend to take a liberal-activist stance, especially social scientists. In China, experts' affiliation may also contribute to their heterogeneity. For example, Huang (2015) found that when rumours decrease people's political trust, public figures who are distant from the government have greater persuasive power in rebuttal, which suggested people had a divergent perception with experts in different background. Generally speaking, employees in state apparatus or semi-official think tanks have a closer relation with the regime if in compare with a domestic university or foreign university professors. In summary, the above studies reminded us beside of the features Grundmann (2017) emphasized, study public attitude towards experts in China must take political trust and other political attitudes into consideration as mediator both for theoretical or methodological concern.

Research design

We conducted an online survey based on a convenience sample to explore Chinese internet users' perceptions of the standards of expertise and experts' credibility. Table 1 illustrated gender and age in general represented the internet population, but education level at undergraduate or above was over sample. Although our sample is not

Table 1. Sample demography.

		This Survey	Internet Population	National Population
Gender	Male	50%	51%	51%
	Female	50%	49%	49%
Age	below30	43%	38%	36%
	30–39	37%	20%	15%
	40 and above	20%	42%	49%
Education	Below Undergraduate	50%	81%	86%
	Undergraduate or above	50%	19%	14%

The Internet population statistics come from CNNIC report (http://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/202009/P020200929546215182514.pdf); The National Population comes from https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01&zb=A0301&sj=2019.

representative of the general population or internet users, recruiting respondents online has advantages for our research question. Respondents of online surveys on topics of public affairs are usually highly educated and care about issues related to public interests and politics (Shao et al., 2021). They are also more active in political participation than the general population and more likely to voice their support and opposition on the internet, arguably the most important outlet for expression of public opinion in countries with no competitive elections, such as China. Since online public opinion influences the policy process (Zhang & Ding, 2017), our sample is not only the CCP's key target for policy legitimation but also can provide a more suitable dataset for us to answer the questions that we are concerned with than the general public.

Our survey was divided into three parts. Followed Grundmann (2017), we first asked respondents what is the most important qualification an expert needs. The response items are as follows:

(1) Professional experience (measured by years of working in the field)
(2) A doctoral degree (in the related field)
(3) Outspokenness towards government policy
(4) Wide public recognition
(5) Government endorsement
(6) Personal connections with government
(7) Overseas education or working experience

In the second part, we examined respondents' perceived state-expert relationship by comparing experts with other actors regarding to their expertise and autonomy through two sets of questions. In the first set of questions (see Table 2), respondents were asked their opinion on experts as 'external brains' (i.e., how much autonomy they should have and how much weight their opinion should receive in policy making). The second question further required respondents to evaluate the expertise and the likelihood of expressing independent opinion of five experts with different backgrounds: 1) a domestic university professor, 2) a government researcher, 3) a journalist, 4) a professor from an American university, and 5) an expert from the United Nations. There are two reasons for including different expert background especially foreign experts in the survey. First, previous studies such as Jones (2019) suggested that expert background matter to public perception. In the context of China, state propaganda system may induce people's suspicion in expert opinion close to government position (H. He et al., 2018; Huang, 2015). Expert background provided a tool for them to measure the relative distance from the regime/government. Second, Fang (2022) found that the China government frequently referenced foreign experts' opinion for the purpose of propaganda and policy legitimation.[7] We want to know how the public perceive foreign experts in comparison to their domestic counterparts.

The third part asked respondents their opinions on experts' policy influence and its appropriateness, with the opinions of different actors (ordinary people, private entrepreneurs, civil servants, and upper-level government officials) taken as benchmarks.

As we mentioned before, an individual's attitude towards the experts is likely influenced by his or her perception of the regime/government and the political attitudes associated with his or her ideology. We therefore not only measured respondents'

Table 2. Public attitudes on the weight of expert opinion in policy making.

Items	Statement
Public>Expert	If disagreement exists between experts and the public, the latter's opinion should have the priority in policy making.
Expert>Official	Expert opinion should have priority over government officials' opinion in policy making.
Usefulness of expert opinion	Expert opinion is useless in solving social problems.
Independence from the government	The merit of expert opinion lies in providing policy alternatives to the government position.
Independence from the public	The merit of expert opinion lies in providing policy alternatives to the position held by the majority.
No Autonomy	Experts do not have autonomy and speak only in the interest of their funders.

questions measured in 10-points scale, 1 Strongly Disagree- 10 Strongly Agree.

political trust (towards the central and local governments) and social trust (towards friends and neighbours) but also asked questions related to their political stance as seen in Table 3. We first include nationalism and authoritarianism, they are prevalent in China's political culture and internet (e.g., Liu, 2019; Lu & Shi, 2015). Socialism is used to measure the extent of satisfaction in redistribution (Lu, 2014), while traditionalism here measured the relative weight of scientific knowledge in policy making, thus serves as a proxy of populism (Bertsou & Caramani, 2022).

Finally, we collected respondents' demographic information, such as age, gender, education level and income.

Results

Descriptive statistics

The survey was conducted between June 11 and 27 June 2019. A survey company was hired to distribute the questionnaire online to respondents who took the survey voluntarily. In total, 3,555 respondents started the survey, and 1,694 finished (completion rate 47.7%). As a quality control, we removed those who finished the survey within less than two minutes and obtained 1,634 valid respondents. Sixty-five percent of the respondents were 35 or younger, and over 50% had received education to the college level or above. In addition, 56% of them had a monthly income higher than 9,000 Chinese yuan.

Figure 1 provides the descriptive statistics on respondents' perceptions of experts. We start with expert qualifications. According to Panel A, most respondents selected professional experience as the most important item determining expert qualifications, with a mean of 18.5 years working in the field, followed by possession of a doctoral degree and government endorsement in second and third place. Panel B suggested broad disagreement with the assertions that expert opinion is useless and that experts have no autonomy (with both items receiving responses lower than 5 on the 10-point scale). Respondents in general agreed that expert opinion should be independent from the public and government (with a response of approximately 7 on the 10-point scale) and shows a similar level of agreement with the statement that expert opinion should have priority over government officials' opinion in policy making.

We then move to Panels C and D. According to Panel D, respondents seemed to have more confidence in the level of expertise of experts with foreign backgrounds (whom they give scores above 3 on a 4-point scale), corresponding to Fang (2022)'s recent finding

Figure 1. Public attitudes towards experts.

that referring to foreign experts' opinions is a strategy for policy legitimation in China's propaganda system. Interestingly, experts with foreign backgrounds are also considered more likely to express independent opinions (with scores above 3 from all respondents). As government researchers received the lowest score (approximately 2.5), the closer experts are to the government, the less confident respondents were in the experts' autonomy.

Finally, regarding policy influence in Panel E, experts are influential (with scores above 3 on a 4-point scale). Although they were deemed as influential as upper-government officials, experts received a score significantly higher than other actors (all approximately 2–2.5). Perhaps more interestingly, ordinary people received the third rank ahead of civil servants and private entrepreneurs. Such a perception is not consistent with the general theory of authoritarianism or previous studies on Chinese politics (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Dickson, 2008; Tsai, 2007); why respondents believe ordinary people have substantial policy influence is not our main concern in the present study but is worthy of further study. The same pattern reappears in Panel F. Because the appropriateness of influence is measured on a 5-point scale, a score of approximately 3 can be interpreted as 'appropriate'. Respondents therefore think that the influence that experts have is suitable but that the influence of upper-level government officials is excessive.

Regression

To explain the heterogeneity in the perceptions of experts' expertise and autonomy, we examine how they correlate with respondents' political trust and ideology by estimating a regression (the full regression results are in Appendix). The results in columns 1 to 5 in Table 4 suggest that political trust (especially political trust in the central government) is a strong predictor of the attitude towards experts. The higher the trust in the central government, the lower is respondents' agreement that expert opinion is useless or that experts lack autonomy. Respondents are more likely to admit the value of expert opinion when they deem experts to be independent from the government and the public. They also tend to agree that expert opinion should be more important than government officials' opinion in policy making, while less agreed-upon public opinion should be a priority. As all dependent variables in Table 4 are measured on a 4-point scale, according

Table 3. Measurement in Ideology.

Items	Statement
National Pride	即使可以选择任何国家, 我也更愿意做中国公民
	Even if I can freely choose my nationality, I would rather to be a Chinese.
National Humiliation	'百年国耻'不仅描述中国的过去, 而且描述当今外国人是如何对待中国的
	'Hundred-Year Humiliation' is not only the history of China, but also describes how foreigners treat China nowadays.
Authoritarianism	老百姓只有服从政府的决定, 国家才能搞好
	Our country will be prosperous if people are obeyed to government decision.
Socialism	靠运作资金赚钱的人, 对社会的贡献比不上靠劳动赚钱的人
	People who make money through capital contribute less to the society than labourer.
Traditionalism	传统文化的经验, 蕴含很高深的智慧, 即使暂时没有得到科学证据的支持, 我们也要小心翼翼地遵守
	We should follow traditional culture, it is wisdom even through sometimes without support from scientific evidence.

Note: It is a 10-point scale, 1Totally Disagree – 10 Totally Agree.

Table 4. Public attitudes towards expert autonomy and the weight of expert opinion in policy making.

	(1) Expert Useless	(2) No Autonomy	(3) Expert> Official	(4) Independence from Government	(5) Independence from Public	(6) Public> Expert
Trust in Central Gov	−0.159***	−0.121***	0.166***	0.159***	0.091**	−0.109**
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Trust in Local Gov	−0.040	−0.116***	−0.027	−0.023	0.010	−0.073**
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Social Trust	−0.041	−0.011	0.034	0.028	0.017	0.075**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
National Pride	−0.116***	−0.154***	0.018	0.023	0.034	−0.008
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)
National Humiliation	0.087***	0.100***	0.024	0.073***	0.075***	0.050**
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Authoritarianism	0.003	0.020	−0.036	0.011	0.028	0.035
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Socialism	0.182***	0.142***	0.010	−0.028	−0.038	0.190***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Traditionalism	0.065**	0.083***	0.152***	0.072**	0.082***	0.136***
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	5.010***	4.673***	3.356***	3.400***	3.009***	3.474***
	(0.474)	(0.505)	(0.426)	(0.499)	(0.494)	(0.492)
Observations	1,634	1,634	1,634	1,634	1,634	1,634
R Squared	0.151	0.161	0.082	0.062	0.064	0.111

OLS estimators are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses; education level reweight based on internet population; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$; the full table is available in the Appendix.

to the OLS regression estimation, a one-unit increase in political trust contributes an approximately 2–4% marginal change in respondents' attitudes, which represents a substantial influence. Although it also matters, political trust in the local government is significant only for some items by a less salient margin. One may be curious if according to Figure 1 Panel B, respondents in general highly agreed with the statements that experts should have autonomy, then why their attitudes towards experts are highly correlated with political trust? Noticing that expert autonomy in China, as Zhu and Xue (2007) pointed out, did not refer to institutional independence but to the extent they are able to express a different opinion with the government or public. Results in Table 4 should be interpreted as the higher political trust (or more satisfaction in regime performance) respondents have, the more they admit the value of experts as 'external brain'.

When the state-expert relationship in China as discussed above is taken into consideration, it is less surprising to find correlation between political trust and expert autonomy because the latter doesn't not have the same meaning as in United States or other democracies. However, Figure 1 Panel B and Table 4 tell little about the mechanism on how trust affects perceived expert autonomy. A possible reason is experts may regard as part of the state apparatus as they are frequently provided policy consultation for government and shared their opinions (usually constructive or supportive) on government policy in the media (Shen et al., 2022; Zhu, 2009, 2013). Figure 1 Panel E reveals that respondents perceived experts as the second most influential policy actor (only less influential than upper-government official) provides some evidence support this inference. The results in Table 5 Model 6 as explained below also suggest that respondents

Table 5. Public attitudes towards expert autonomy and level of expertise by expert background.

	(1) Independence: Gov. Researcher	(2) Independence: Domestic Prof	(3) Independence: American Prof	(4) Independence: Journalists	(5) Independence: U.N. Experts	(6) Expertise: Gov. Researcher	(7) Expertise: Domestic Prof	(8) Expertise: American Prof	(9) Expertise: Journalists	(10) Expertise: U. N. Experts
Trust in Central Gov	0.042*	−0.000	0.005	−0.020	0.009	0.034	0.022	0.021	−0.021	0.038*
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Trust in Local Gov	0.063***	0.051***	0.022	0.025	0.007	0.063***	0.047***	0.008	0.021	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Social Trust	−0.018	0.005	0.025*	0.022	0.006	−0.025*	0.015	0.032**	0.023	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)
National Pride	−0.014	0.029*	−0.017	0.033*	0.005	0.019	0.014	−0.023*	−0.021	0.018
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
National Humiliation	−0.003	−0.008	0.012	0.005	0.017	0.005	0.008	−0.007	0.015	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Authoritarianism	0.032**	0.021**	−0.037***	−0.004	0.010	0.013	−0.009	−0.008	0.010	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Socialism	−0.019	−0.025**	−0.019*	−0.025*	−0.029**	−0.005	−0.021**	−0.032***	0.017	−0.029***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Traditionalism	0.003	0.014	0.011	0.008	−0.024*	−0.014	−0.005	0.002	0.010	−0.013
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.035)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.541***	2.509***	3.280***	2.463***	3.115***	2.075***	2.690***	3.116***	1.982***	3.087***
	(0.286)	(0.216)	(0.214)	(0.247)	(0.239)	(0.262)	(0.217)	(0.237)	(0.254)	(0.231)
Observations	818	818	818	818	818	818	818	818	818	818
R Squared	0.111	0.093	0.058	0.045	0.035	0.096	0.084	0.047	0.043	0.053

OLS estimators are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses; education level reweight based on internet population; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$; the full table is available in the Appendix.

established a connection between experts and the regime/government. An alternative interpretation is as previous studies pointed out, the CCP believed that a good quality policy making has benefits to the regime performance, while the quality of policy making would be improved by independent and constructive expert opinions (Ieong & Wu, 2020; Shen, Ieong & Zhu, 2022). Such 'instrumental' view in expert involvement according to Table 4 is also shared by high central political trust respondents who tend to satisfy with regime performance. As an exploratory study, we however admitted the above findings and explanations are preliminary rather than causal, future studies should continue to explore the relation between political trust and perception on expert autonomy in China.

Regarding the influence of political attitudes, nationalist sentiment shows an ambiguous effect. The effects of national pride and national humiliation are in contradiction. Those with higher levels of the former express greater appreciation of the value of expert opinion, while those with high values on the latter show the opposite belief. Respondents who are inclined to emphasize national humiliation are also more likely to prefer populism even if they acknowledge the merits of expertise because experts express a different opinion from that of government officials and the public. The above finding is similar to the conclusion of Bertsou and Caramani (2022) for European democracies that populism and technocratic attitudes indeed have substantial overlap; the former does not equate to a preference for discarding expert problem solving. We find no significant effect of authoritarianism. Regarding the effect of socialism and traditionalism, again, we can observe a tendency towards populism. While respondents who prefer socialism and traditionalism are more likely to recognize the importance of expert opinion in policy making, the most interesting finding lies in how much weight respondents believe expert opinion should have. A respondent expressing strong traditionalism is likely to agree that expert opinion should override government officials' opinion but to believe that the will of the people should come first.

We also examine the effect of political trust on perceptions of experts with different backgrounds. According to Table 5, trust in the local government matters more in this case than trust in the central government. Respondents with higher trust in the local government also more highly rate the autonomy and expertise of government researchers (0.063 and 0.063 respectively) and domestic university professors (0.051 and 0.047, respectively). While a higher level of trust in the central government increases respondents' agreement that government researchers have autonomy (0.042), interestingly, it makes respondents more likely to recognize the expertise of United Nations experts (0.038) but has no effect on their perceptions of other experts. In general, political trust has less explanatory power for the heterogeneity in attitudes towards experts in different background. Regarding the effect of political attitudes, preferences for authoritarianism and socialism are more correlated than other political orientations with respondents' attitudes towards experts. The former has a positive effect on the perception of autonomy among domestic experts (government researchers and domestic university professors), while the latter induces a negative perception of experts regardless of their background. Because socialism reflects respondents' satisfaction in redistribution, a strong socialist tendency reflects the hostility respondents towards capitalist/power (Hutchison & Xu, 2017; Zhou & Jin, 2018). Therefore, a possible explanation for their discrediting of experts is that they perceive experts as speaking for power or monied interests rather than

speaking the truth since we also found a strong socialist tendency tend to prioritize the will of people ahead of expert opinion in Table 5.

Finally, we examine how political trust and political attitudes influence perceptions of experts' policy influence and its appropriateness. We nevertheless find that in general, these variables are not significant predictors, with the R squared in most models being less than 0.05 (see Appendix B: Table A4).

Conclusion

In this study, we conducted the first survey of public attitudes towards experts in China. Our findings are as follows. First, professional experience is the most important item that respondents used in evaluating expert qualifications, followed by possession of a doctoral degree and endorsement from government. Second, political trust, especially trust in the central government, is a strong predictor of perceptions of the merit of expert opinion and expert autonomy. Third, most of the measurements of respondents' political attitudes demonstrates a tendency towards populism, on the one hand, respondents generally recognize that expert opinion has benefits; on the other hand, they believe that the will of people should have more weight than government officials' and experts' opinion in policy making. Finally, political trust and political attitudes have less explanatory power with respect to the within-group heterogeneity in perceptions of experts with different backgrounds. The above variables are mostly insignificant in predicting the perception of experts' policy influence and its appropriateness.

The above findings reveal some similarities and unique features of the politics of expertise in China. On the one hand, even if the sample can't represent either the internet or national population, we observe an underlying tension between an increasingly technocratic policy process and populism in society (reflected in the relatively high mean score of traditionalism in appendix Table A1), as also seen in other countries. On the other hand, what makes China different is the importance of political trust as a mediator. Experts are, by definition, neutral and stay away from party politics in Western society. In China, however, we find that the merits of experts closely related to political trust. Follow Zhu and Xue (2007), we suggested expert autonomy in China should be interpreted as government's 'external brain', which did not necessarily undermine under a close state-expert relationship. Nevertheless, our survey also revealed the background of experts matter to public perception, foreign experts in general are perceived as to have more expertise and autonomy. According to Jones (2019), the same observation also happened in Gulf autocracies. How the state-expert relationship makes influence on the role of expert in policy legitimation should receive more attention in further studies not only in the context of China but also in other authoritarian regimes. Within this context, the Chinese government will continue to make use of the deficit model of communication of expertise in policy making. In addition to requiring high political trust as a foundation, policy legitimation is most likely to arise from justification by experts who are distant from power.

Notes

1. For example, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Chinese Academy of Engineering.
2. For example, Stone (1996) 'nonprofit organisations engaged in the analysis of public policy issues independent of government, political parties and interest groups'.
3. The eleven steps are 'mid-term evaluation', 'early-stage research', 'formation of Basic Thinking behind the National Five-Year Plan', 'drafting of the Suggestions of the CCP concerning the Making of the Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Development(Suggestions)', 'approval of the "Suggestions"', 'drafting of an Outline of the Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Development of the PRC (Outline)', 'elucidation by the National Plan Expert Commission', 'extensive solicitation of internal and external opinions', "the National People's Congress's deliberation over and approval of the 'Outline (Draft)', the official announcement of the 'Outline', and 'the implementation of the plan'.
4. See Article 7 in the *Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the Building of a Government Ruled by Law*, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8553&CGid=, accessed 8 March 2022.
5. For example, more than 550 articles published over a two-year interval result from a search with the keywords 'Zhang Nanshan' on the Xinhua News Agency official website. See http://so.news.cn/#search/0/%E9%90%98%E5%8D%97%E5%B1%B1/1/, accessed 2 March 2022.
6. For example, see, Costa-Font et al. (2008) and Johnston and Ballard (2016).
7. Although foreign experts directly participated in China's policy process is not common, they had ever been actors in some critical policy reforms. Two examples are China's market reform in the 1980s and the New Urban Medical Care System reform taken place in 2006, see, Gewirtz (2017) and ZZhu (2013).

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Appendix A: Survey Question

Public Attitude towards Expert
Part 1: Expert Qualification
你如何判断一个人是某个政策领域的专家?请选出最重要的条件。What determines one as Expert in a realm? Please select the most important item in evaluation.

- 敢于批评政府决策 (Outspoken towards government policy)
- 享有很高知名度 (Well-known in public)
- 在相关领域有N年工作经验(N为受访者所回答的'至少工作年限') N Years Working Experience (N equals to the answer in the question of [Working Years])
- 被政府认定为'特殊贡献专家'(received government endorsement as 'expert with outstanding contribution')
- 在相关政府部门有人脉 (Have connections with government)
- 拥有相关领域的博士学位 (Have a doctoral degree in the related field)
- 有海外留学或工作背景 (Oversea education or working experience)

Working Years
你觉得一个人要成为行业或领域的专家, 至少要在该行业工作多少年?[1–30] In your opinion, how many years are required for one to become an expert in a realm? [1–30]

Part 2: Expert Autonomy and the Weight of Expert Opinion in Policy Making
How much you agree with the following statements? [10-points scale, 1 Strongly Disagree- 10 Strongly Agree]

Items	Statement
Public>Expert	专家和公众意见不一致, 应该听公众 If disagreement appeared between experts and the public, the latter's opinion should have the priority in policy making.
Expert>Official	专家学者都埋头故纸堆, 对现实社会问题帮助不大Expert opinion has the priority in policy making if compare with government officials.
Usefulness of expert opinion	专家学者都埋头故纸堆, 对现实社会问题帮助不大Expert opinion is useless in solving social problem.
Independence from the government	专家学者的价值在于敢于说出不同于政府官员立场的意见 The merit of expert opinion laid in providing policy alternatives other than government position.
Independence from the public	专家学者的价值在于敢说出不同于社会大多数人立场的意见 The merit of expert opinion laid in providing policy alternatives other than position hold by the majority.
No Autonomy	专家学者缺乏独立性, 通常都只为资助自己的人说好话Experts do not have autonomy and only speak with the interest of funder.

Expert Autonomy and Level of Expertise in Different Backgrounds
你觉得以下背景的专家, 他们愿不愿意发表自己独立的 (甚至和政府不一致) 的观点?他们的专业水平如何? Here is a list of experts with different background. In your opinion, are they willing to express independent (even against the government) opinions? What do you think their level of expertise?

- Experts from the United Nation
- Professor from an American University
- Journalists (with knowledge in the realm)
- Government Researchers
- University Professors in our Country (China)

Part 3: Expert Policy Influence and its Appropriateness
在政策制定中, 以下各方的实际影响力有多大?为了制定出最优的政策, 他们的影响力是适当的吗? In the policy process, how much policy influence do you think the following actors have? [4-points scale, 1 Very little-4 Very Large]; Is the influence suitable? [5-points scale, 1Too Little –5 Too Large]

- Expert

- Private Entrepreneur
- Ordinary People
- Upper-Level Government Official
- Civil Servant

Appendix B: Full Regression Results

Table A1. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs
Male	1.503	0.500	1	2	1634
Age	3.025	1.608	1	8	1634
Education	4.176	1.187	1	6	1634
East	0.541	0.498	0	1	1634
State Work	0.220	0.414	0	1	1634
Monthly Income	3.684	1.460	1	7	1634
Internet News	0.429	0.495	0	1	1634
Newspaper/Magazine	0.013	0.113	0	1	1634
TV/Radio	0.130	0.337	0	1	1634
Foreign Media Exposure	2.371	0.754	1	4	1634
Trust in the Central Government	8.493	1.833	1	10	1634
Trust in the Local Government	6.732	2.367	1	10	1634
Social Trust	6.218	2.049	1	10	1634
National Pride	8.576	2.015	1	10	1634
National Humiliation	5.968	2.644	1	10	1634
Authoritarianism	5.421	2.526	1	10	1634
Socialism	4.454	2.487	1	10	1634
Traditionalism	6.998	2.161	1	10	1634
Expert Useless	3.787	2.053	1	10	1634
No Autonomy	4.290	2.232	1	10	1634
Expert>Official	6.991	1.864	1	10	1634
Independence from the government	6.966	2.080	1	10	1634
Independence from the public	6.685	2.114	1	10	1634
Public>Expert	4.640	2.211	1	10	1634
Influence: Experts	3.060	0.692	1	4	816
Influence: Private Entrepreneur	2.221	0.743	1	4	816
Influence: Ordinary People	2.516	0.989	1	4	816
Influence: Upper-Level Officials	3.229	0.750	1	4	816
Influence: Civil Servant	2.124	0.766	1	4	816
Appropriateness: Experts	3.344	0.860	1	5	816
Appropriateness: Private Entrepreneur	2.711	0.941	1	5	816
Appropriateness: Ordinary People	2.857	1.226	1	5	816
Appropriateness: Upper-Level Officials	3.822	0.979	1	5	816
Appropriateness: Civil Servant	2.659	1.020	1	5	816
Independence: Government Researcher	2.609	0.859	1	4	818
Independence: Domestic University Professor	3.086	0.664	1	4	818
Independence: American Professor	3.367	0.687	1	4	818
Independence: Journalists	3.128	0.788	1	4	818
Independence: U.N. Experts	3.381	0.718	1	4	818
Expertise: Government Researcher	2.718	0.765	1	4	818
Expertise: Domestic University Professor	3.180	0.649	1	4	818
Expertise: American Professor	3.238	0.681	1	4	818
Expertise: Journalists	2.209	0.769	1	4	818
Expertise: U.N. Experts	3.370	0.668	1	4	818

Table A2. Full regression in public attitude towards expert autonomy and the weight of expert opinion in policy making.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Expert Useless	No Autonomy	Expert> Official	Independence from Government	Independence from Public	Public> Expert
Trust in Central Gov	−0.159***	−0.121***	0.166***	0.159***	0.091**	−0.109**
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Trust in Local Gov	−0.040	−0.116***	−0.027	−0.023	0.010	−0.073**
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Social Trust	−0.041	−0.011	0.034	0.028	0.017	0.075**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
National Pride	−0.116***	−0.154***	0.018	0.023	0.034	−0.008
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)
National Humiliation	0.087***	0.100***	0.024	0.073***	0.075***	0.050**
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Authoritarianism	0.003	0.020	−0.036	0.011	0.028	0.035
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Socialism	0.182***	0.142***	0.010	−0.028	−0.038	0.190***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Traditionalism	0.065**	0.083***	0.152***	0.072**	0.082***	0.136***
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Male	−0.026	0.500***	−0.060	0.020	0.045	−0.069
	(0.097)	(0.105)	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Age	0.004	0.031	0.089***	0.072**	0.021	0.025
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Education	−0.029	−0.073	0.098**	0.057	0.112**	−0.018
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)
East	0.168*	0.122	−0.039	−0.055	−0.098	0.041
	(0.098)	(0.107)	(0.094)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.109)
State Work	0.115	0.048	0.134	−0.049	−0.025	−0.201
	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.105)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.127)
Monthly Income	−0.050	0.038	0.051	0.040	0.025	−0.010
	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Internet News	0.216**	0.270**	−0.054	0.256**	0.299***	0.056
	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.099)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.116)
Newspaper/ Magazine	0.063	−0.064	−0.400	0.643	0.763**	0.885**
	(0.380)	(0.375)	(0.337)	(0.404)	(0.310)	(0.356)
TV/Radio	0.216	0.089	−0.140	0.108	0.183	0.160
	(0.166)	(0.179)	(0.143)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.176)
Foreign Media Exposure	−0.026	0.003	0.104	0.170**	0.264***	−0.002
	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Constant	5.010***	4.673***	3.356***	3.400***	3.009***	3.474***
	(0.474)	(0.505)	(0.426)	(0.499)	(0.494)	(0.492)
Observations	1,634	1,634	1,634	1,634	1,634	1,634
R-squared	0.151	0.161	0.082	0.062	0.064	0.111

OLS estimators are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses; education level reweight based on internet population;
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3. Full regression in public attitude towards expert autonomy and level of expertise in different backgrounds.

	(1) Independence: Government Researcher	(2) Independence: Chinese Professor	(3) Independence: American Professor	(4) Independence: Journalists	(5) Independence: U.N. Experts	(6) Expertise: Government Researcher	(7) Expertise: Chinese Professor	(8) Expertise: American Professor	(9) Expertise: Journalists	(10) Expertise: U.N. Experts
Trust in central gov	0.042*	−0.000	0.005	−0.020	0.009	0.034	0.022	0.021	−0.021	0.038*
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Trust in local gov	0.063***	0.051***	0.022	0.025	0.007	0.063***	0.047***	0.008	0.021	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Social Trust	−0.018	0.005	0.025*	0.022	0.006	−0.025*	0.015	0.032**	0.023	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)
National Pride	−0.014	0.029*	−0.017	0.033*	0.005	0.019	0.014	−0.023*	−0.021	0.018
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
National Humiliation	−0.003	−0.008	0.012	0.005	0.017	0.005	0.008	−0.007	0.015	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Authoritarianism	0.032**	0.021**	−0.037***	−0.004	0.010	0.013	−0.009	−0.008	0.010	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Socialism	−0.019	−0.025**	−0.019*	−0.025*	−0.029**	−0.005	−0.021**	−0.032***	0.017	−0.029***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Traditionalism	0.003	0.014	0.011	0.008	−0.024*	−0.014	−0.005	0.002	0.010	−0.013
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Male	−0.072	0.015	−0.027	−0.018	0.064	−0.048	−0.037	0.019	−0.110**	−0.070
	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.047)
Age	−0.043**	−0.021	−0.014	0.006	0.000	0.004	−0.016	−0.011	−0.006	0.013
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education	−0.090***	−0.018	0.053**	0.065**	0.029	−0.034	−0.004	0.019	0.018	0.015
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.025)
East	−0.016	−0.054	0.033	−0.060	0.040	0.024	−0.121***	0.029	−0.008	−0.011
	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.047)

(Continued)

Table A3. (Continued).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Public Sector	-0.114*	-0.062	-0.038	0.072	0.076	-0.104	0.003	-0.025	0.097	0.017
	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.056)
Monthly Income	-0.038*	0.001	0.010	0.043**	0.003	-0.003	0.024	0.030*	-0.010	0.014
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Internet News	-0.006	0.004	0.032	-0.008	0.007	-0.009	0.063	0.032	0.082	-0.019
	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.049)
Newspaper/ Magazine	0.301	0.128	-0.062	-0.172	-0.368	0.488***	0.331*	-0.124	0.461**	-0.231
	(0.228)	(0.220)	(0.224)	(0.172)	(0.243)	(0.161)	(0.170)	(0.195)	(0.218)	(0.248)
TV/Radio	0.054	-0.006	-0.004	-0.079	-0.119	-0.024	-0.009	-0.049	-0.052	-0.193**
	(0.097)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.080)
Foreign Media Exposure	0.090**	0.027	-0.075**	-0.037	-0.018	0.070*	-0.013	-0.045	0.046	-0.001
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.035)
Constant	2.541***	2.509***	3.280***	2.463***	3.115***	2.075***	2.690***	3.116***	1.982***	3.087***
	(0.286)	(0.216)	(0.214)	(0.247)	(0.239)	(0.262)	(0.217)	(0.237)	(0.254)	(0.231)
Observations	818	818	818	818	818	818	818	818	818	818
R-squared	0.111	0.093	0.058	0.045	0.035	0.096	0.084	0.047	0.043	0.053

OLS estimators are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses; education level reweight based on internet population; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.01$.

Table A4. Public attitude towards expert policy influence and its appropriateness.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Influence: Expert	Influence: Entrepreneur	Influence: Ordinary People	Influence: Upper-level official	Influence: Civil Servant	Appropriateness: Expert	Appropriateness: Entrepreneur	Appropriateness: Ordinary People	Appropriateness: Upper-level Official	Appropriateness: Civil Servant
Trust in central gov	−0.005	0.008	0.032	0.004	−0.036*	0.022	−0.006	0.038	−0.019	−0.006
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Trust in local gov	0.053***	−0.002	−0.009	0.011	0.025	0.030*	0.014	0.008	−0.017	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Social Trust	0.012	0.018	0.015	0.003	0.020	0.008	0.027	−0.011	0.028	0.025
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.020)
National Pride	0.021	0.012	−0.003	−0.007	−0.008	0.016	−0.010	−0.003	0.013	−0.017
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.022)
National Humiliation	−0.006	−0.003	−0.011	0.003	0.006	−0.000	0.014	−0.011	−0.007	0.021
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Authoritarianism	−0.000	0.013	0.018	−0.014	0.020*	0.007	0.026*	0.046**	−0.035**	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Socialism	−0.017	0.023*	0.022	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.012	0.014	0.004	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Traditionalism	0.013	−0.011	−0.003	0.039***	0.032**	0.025	−0.041**	−0.025	0.030*	0.024
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Male	−0.016	0.040	−0.184**	0.039	0.042	0.005	−0.005	−0.214**	0.169***	0.083
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.090)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Age	0.008	−0.027	−0.027	0.007	−0.006	0.013	−0.039*	−0.027	0.038	−0.033
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Education	0.039*	−0.044*	−0.047	−0.001	−0.006	−0.019	−0.044	−0.084*	0.003	−0.019
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.034)
East	0.007	0.001	−0.052	0.060	0.039	0.032	0.011	−0.139	0.014	0.072
	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.076)
State Work	−0.049	0.052	0.128	0.137**	−0.029	0.006	0.001	0.191*	0.186**	−0.110
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.105)	(0.085)	(0.091)
Monthly Income	0.006	−0.041**	−0.055**	0.017	−0.043**	0.018	−0.075***	−0.040	0.029	−0.055**
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Internet News	0.080	−0.012	−0.039	0.085	0.043	0.069	−0.071	−0.057	0.128*	0.099

(Continued)

Table A4. (Continued).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.076)	(0.081)
Newspaper/Magazine	−0.419	−0.051	−0.041	−0.388*	−0.146	−0.105	−0.367	0.425	−0.464	0.208
	(0.284)	(0.151)	(0.273)	(0.232)	(0.240)	(0.304)	(0.346)	(0.286)	(0.458)	(0.413)
TV/Radio	−0.130	−0.029	0.006	−0.064	0.110	−0.046	−0.067	0.055	−0.167	0.045
	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.092)	(0.087)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.140)	(0.117)	(0.115)
Foreign Media Exposure	0.031	0.078**	−0.001	−0.068*	0.047	0.083*	0.059	0.013	−0.029	0.000
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	2.229***	2.039***	2.919***	2.878***	1.801***	2.282***	3.090***	3.435***	3.321***	2.530***
	(0.248)	(0.236)	(0.328)	(0.243)	(0.250)	(0.313)	(0.314)	(0.405)	(0.313)	(0.343)
Observations	816	816	816	816	816	816	816	816	816	816
R-squared	0.077	0.036	0.033	0.035	0.040	0.047	0.039	0.042	0.052	0.025

OLS estimators are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses; education level reweight based on internet population;*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$